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This paper illustrates the impact of moral hazard for estimating relative rates of underinsurance and
to present an adjustment method to correct for this source of bias. Individuals or households are often
classified as underinsured if out-of-pocket spending on medical care relative to income exceeds some
threshold.  We show that, without adjustment, this common threshold measure of underinsurance will
underestimate the number with low levels of insurance coverage due to moral hazard.  We propose
an adjustment method and apply it to the specific case of estimating the difference in rates of underinsurance
among small- versus large-firm workers with full-year, employer-sponsored insurance. Using data
from the 2005 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey, we find that after applying the adjustment, the underinsurance
rate of small-firm households increases by approximately 20% with the adjustment for moral hazard
and the difference in underinsurance rates between large firm and small firm households widens substantially.
Adjusting for moral hazard makes a sizeable difference in the estimated prevalence of underinsurance
using a threshold measure.
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  Health care spending in the United States has increased dramatically over the last few 
decades -- averaging 3.7% real growth per year from 1995 to 2005 -- and rapid growth is 
predicted to continue (Congressional Budget Office, 2008).  In response to this growth, many 
employers are making changes to their health insurance benefit design to include more cost-
sharing provisions, such as higher deductibles and co-insurance.  Because of these trends, there 
is growing concern that merely having some form of health insurance is insufficient and that 
insured households are becoming less able to afford the cost of their medical care.  That is, in 
addition to a large number of households not having health insurance, a large number of 
households may be “underinsured.”   
In order to quantify the number of households that face difficulties in paying for medical 
expenses, researchers have defined various measures of underinsurance.  Underinsurance is 
typically understood as health insurance failing to provide adequate protection against health 
care expenditures (for example, see Bashshur et al. (1993)). Several measures of underinsurance 
have been adopted since there is no consensus on how to apply this concept to health insurance.  
In pioneering work, Farley (1985) and Short and Banthin (1995) defined underinsurance by 
combining the risk of a high-expenditure illness and the adequacy of insurance coverage for this 
event.  Others have defined underinsurance using the size of specific insurance benefits (e.g., 
annual deductible) relative to family income (Schoen et al. (2005)) or the actuarial values of 
policies.  For example, Gabel et al. (2006) documented that the actuarial value of policies 




The most common underinsurance measure is a threshold measure.  A threshold measure 
indicates whether a household has spent a certain percentage or more of income on out-of-pocket 
health care expenditures (see Shearer (2000), Merlis (2002), Schoen et al. (2005), Collins et al. 
(2009), Banthin and Bernard (2006), Ziller et al. (2006), Banthin et al. (2008), Schoen et al. 
(2008)). Threshold measures of underinsurance are used because they are easy to compute given 
available data and are easy to explain.  A commonly used threshold for working-aged 
populations is 10% of household income.    
Of course, there are normative assumptions built into this measure just as in any 
threshold measure of well-being.
1  Different thresholds can be applied to different populations, 
for example, households in poverty or elderly families.  Regardless of the level of threshold used, 
or whether the same threshold is applied to all populations, this method for measuring 
underinsurance fails to take into account the fact that households with less comprehensive 
coverage tend to consume less medical care than they would if they had better insurance, or 
alternatively, that generously insured households tend to consume more medical care than they 
would if they has less generous insurance.  
Economic theory (see Cutler and Zeckhauser (1999)), non-experimental studies (e.g., 
Newhouse and Phelps (1972), Bhattacharya, et al. (1996)), and experimental studies (Manning, 
et al. (1987)) all find that health insurance expenditures respond positively to the generosity of 
health insurance; this responsiveness is referred to as “moral hazard.”  
Any threshold measure of underinsurance is a function of actual expenditures for out-of-
pocket health care relative to household income.  Coverage generosity affects out-of-pocket 
                                                            
1 For example, the poverty guidelines similarly imply a threshold level of well-being (Federal Register, January 23, 
2008, pages 3971-3972). 




expenditures in two ways: directly – through co-insurance, deductibles, out-of-pocket spending 
limits, etc. – and indirectly – through the effect of moral hazard.  The concept of underinsurance 
refers to the direct effect: less generous benefit designs will translate into higher out-of-pocket 
expenditures for a given level of total spending.  However, because of the indirect effect, less 
generous insurance also will tend to decrease households’ medical care utilization and 
expenditures through a “reverse” moral hazard effect.  Therefore, a threshold measure of 
underinsurance will underestimate the extent to which households have less generous plans.   
Moreover, when comparing the rate of underinsurance across two populations, the one with less 
generous coverage will be less likely to have high out-of-pocket spending relative to income than 
they would in the absence of a moral hazard effect, causing an underestimate of the difference in 
underinsurance between the two groups.   
In this paper, we show that a threshold measure of underinsurance typically will not 
accurately measure the degree of underinsurance in one population relative to another and 
propose an adjusted threshold measure of underinsurance that takes account moral hazard.  To 
demonstrate this problem and how our proposed adjustment would work, we consider the 
specific case of estimating the difference in rates of underinsurance between households who 
receive their insurance from small-firms versus large-firms.
2  While the adjustment method we 
propose would apply to any threshold measure of underinsurance, we use the 10% threshold 
measure as our baseline case and test the sensitivity of our results using alternative definitions.  
We find that adjusting for moral hazard makes a noticeable difference in relative 
underinsurance rates. According to a 10% threshold measure of underinsurance, which does not 
                                                            
2 Another application of this method would be to a comparison of underinsurance rates between persons with 




account for moral hazard, the underinsurance rate among households whose policyholder is 
employed by a small firm is 90% of that among households whose policyholder is employed by a 
large firm.  That is, despite substantial evidence that small-firm households tend to have less 
generous coverage, these households appear to have relatively lower rates of underinsurance.  
We show, however, that this comparison is misleading because of the moral hazard effect.  After 
adjusting for moral hazard, the underinsurance rate among small firm households is 33% greater 
than that among large firm households. 
II.  Insurance Generosity in Small and Large Firms 
Small firms, when they do offer health insurance, tend to offer less generous insurance 
(Gabel et al. 2006).  According to data from the 2005 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey 
(MEPS) Insurance Component List Sample (see Table 1), while there is variation in generosity 
within both firm-size groups, on average small firms offer insurance with higher deductibles, 
higher copayments, and higher out-of-pocket maximum limits than do larger firms.  For 
example, deductibles among small-firm plans average almost $800 higher than deductibles 
among large-firm plans ($1,875 vs. $1,076).  Hospital co-insurance rates average 19% among 
small-firm plans and average 17% among large-firm plans; drug co-insurance rates average 40% 
among small-firm plans and average 24% among large-firm plans.  Similarly, the family 
maximum annual out-of-pocket limit averages more than $500 higher among small-firm plans 
than among large-firm plans ($5,174 vs. $4,667). 
These plan coverage provisions directly affect the out-of-pocket costs incurred by 
households.  Since small-firm plans tend to provide less generous insurance in terms of 
deductibles, co-payments, co-insurance, and annual out-of-pocket limits, one might expect 




In contrast to what one might expect, a higher percentage (5.2%) of large-firm 
households are underinsured (using a 10% threshold measure) than of small firm households 
(4.7%), according to our analysis, which we describe below.  The explanation for this puzzling 
result is that moral hazard matters for the measurement of relative rates of underinsurance.  That 
is, small-firm households reduce their utilization and expenditure in response to the relatively 
high cost-sharing they face (as a result of having less generous insurance) though a “reverse” 
moral hazard effect.  Having less generous insurance leads many small-firm households to 
reduce their total medical care spending by enough so that they are not counted as underinsured 
by a threshold measure. 
 
III.  The Problem and a Stylized Solution 
In this section, we demonstrate the effect of moral hazard on the measurement of 
underinsurance with a simple example.  We also present a stylized version of the solution we 
propose for the calculation of adjusted underinsurance rates that account for this moral hazard 
effect.  Consider two households, Household X and Household Y, which are identical in all ways 
except in terms of plan generosity. As a consequence of moral hazard, Household X (with the 
generous health insurance plan) spends more on medical care than Household Y (with the stingy 
plan) -- $5,000 versus $3,500 (see Table 2, Panel A).  However, due to the differences in plan 
generosity, their out-of-pocket expenditures are nearly identical: Household X spends $1,500 
out-of-pocket while Household Y spends $1,400 out of pocket.  The income for each household 
is $15,000, so that Household X spends 10% of its income, out-of-pocket, on medical care while 
Household Y spends only 9.3%.  If we were to use a 10% threshold measure of underinsurance, 




(with the stingy plan) would not be.   We will apply our method to small- and large-firm 
households but as the example indicates this is a general result for any two populations with 
different average levels of generosity of coverage.
3 
How might one adjust the threshold measure of underinsurance to account for moral 
hazard?  If we knew how much medical spending Household Y would incur if it had generous 
health insurance, we could use the benefit characteristics of Household Y’s actual (stingy) health 
insurance plan to determine what their out-of-pocket spending would be, accounting for moral 
hazard. We demonstrate how to make such an adjustment in the context of our example (see 
Table 2, Panel B).  In the example, we use Household X’s spending as an estimate of how much 
medical spending Household Y would incur if it had generous health insurance since, by 
assumption, Households X and Y are identical except for the generosity of their health plans.  
Therefore, Household Y’s expected total medical care spending if it had a generous plan is 
$5,000.  To determine the amount of out-of-pocket spending Household Y would incur if it spent 
as much as Household X, but if it also faced the cost-sharing rate of the stingy plan, we multiply 
its expected total spending by its actual average cost-sharing rate.
4  To determine the average 
cost-sharing rate, recall that Household Y spends $3,500 on medical care and spends $1,400 out-
of-pocket.  Thus, the average cost sharing for Household Y (stingy plan) is 40% 
(=$1,400/$3,500).  Adjusted out-of-pocket spending for Household Y is, therefore, $2,000 
(=0.40*5,000).  We propose basing the threshold measure of underinsurance on the ratio of 
                                                            
3 While in our simple example we assume that there are only two plans, one for small firms and one for large firms, 
there is, obviously, substantial heterogeneity in plans within both types of firms. Our method does not rely on there 
being only one type of plan for each group. Rather it applies to a comparison of two groups whose generosity of 
plans differs on average.  Our method could also be expanded to include more than two groups. 
4 Here we are assuming a constant cost-sharing rate across all spending levels.  In our empirical application, we 




adjusted out-of-pocket spending to income.  In this example, this ratio is 0.133 
(=$2,000/$15,000) for Household Y, meaning that this household is underinsured once we 
account for moral hazard.  If we compare this ratio across the two households, Household Y is 
now correctly identified as having less generous coverage and is “more underinsured” than 
Household X. 
  By using the total health care spending of Household X (with the generous plan) in our 
calculation of Household Y’s adjusted out-of-pocket spending, we do not mean to imply that a 
generous health plan represents the “standard” for optimal health insurance.  We could, 
alternatively, adjust the out-of-pocket spending of Household X (with generous insurance) by 
determining how much medical spending it would have incurred if it had stingy health insurance 
(estimated by Household Y’s spending). Since the average cost-sharing rate for Household X is 
30%, adjusted out-of-pocket spending for Household X using the less generous plan as the 
baseline amounts to $1,050 (=0.30*$3,500) and the ratio of adjusted out-of-pocket spending to 
income is 0.07 (=$1,050/$15,000), compared to the ratio of 0.093 for Household Y.  Thus, using 
either the more generous or the stingy plan as the base case leads to an adjustment that increases 
the relative underinsurance rate for the less generously insured household. 
IV.  Data and Measures 
A.  Data 
We use the 2005 MEPS, Household Component (MEPS-HC) for our analysis.  The 
MEPS-HC sample is drawn from respondents to the National Health Interview Survey, which is 




Our sample is restricted to households that report having employer-sponsored insurance 
(ESI) for all members during the entire 2005 calendar year.
5  Our definition of a household is 
based on a relationship unit constructed to include adults plus family members who typically 
would be eligible for dependent coverage under private family plans.  We drop households for 
which we cannot confirm ESI status or that do not have any active workers (e.g., early retirees or 
COBRA enrollees).  After removing observations with missing information, we have data on 
10,384 individuals in 4,642 unique households (corresponding to 119.6 million individuals 
residing in 55.8 million households). 
B.  Measures 
The MEPS-HC contains data on medical care spending, income, employment status, 
establishment size, health insurance coverage, human capital and demographic information, and 
medical conditions for individuals and households. 
Medical Spending: We use information on two types of medical care spending: total and 
out-of-pocket.  We aggregate individual-level spending across household members to get 
household-level out-of-pocket and total medical care spending.  We then inflate the measures to 
$2007 and re-scale them into thousands of dollars.   
                                                            
5 We do not include households with part-year coverage because it is difficult to distinguish households that are 
uninsured for part of the year and underinsured for part of the year from households who are uninsured for part of 
the year and “fully” insured for part of the year.  Also, we do not include households that have multiple types of 
coverage (e.g., ESI for parents, public for children) for a similar reason.  These restrictions help to explain why our 




Income:  We use after-tax household income in the denominator of our threshold 
measures of underinsurance.  Pre-tax household income is aggregated from person-level income 
for the calendar year; we use TAXSIM (version 8.6) to estimate after-tax income.     
Small-Firm / Large-Firm Household: To designate households that obtain ESI through a 
small firm or through a large firm, we first identify the ESI policyholder(s) in the household.  
Second, we construct an indicator for whether the policyholder was employed at a small 
establishment (50 or fewer workers).  Finally, we define small-firm households as those in which 
all ESI coverage (whether through one policyholder or two) was obtained through a small 
establishment.
7   
Human Capital and Demographic Measures: In our total spending models, we include a 
set of measures to capture demographic and human capital attributes of policyholder(s) in the 
household.  In households with two policyholders, we use the higher valued outcome.  In 
particular, we include the age of the policyholder (years), highest education (years), race (white, 
black, Asian/Pacific islander, other (reference category))
8, whether the household is married, and 
number of children in the household who are 17 or under.  We also include a set of dummy 
variables to capture the income quartile of the household.  Since there may be geographic 
differences in benefits, labor market conditions, and provider prices, we also include four region 
dummies (Northeast, Midwest, South, West (excluded)) and an indicator for whether the 
household resides in a metropolitan statistical area to control for these differences. 
                                                            
6 The public-use version of the MEPS does not contain state identifiers.  As a result, we were not able to simulate 
state income tax burden on households meaning that we overestimate after-tax income, leading to more conservative 
estimates of underinsurance. 
7 We use “establishment” and “firm” interchangeably.  The data measure establishment size. 




Medical Conditions: We control for a set of serious medical conditions that household 
members reported because medical care spending is positively related to the presence of such 
medical conditions.  Using the Medical Conditions file in the MEPS, we construct a set of 
variables corresponding to the number of household members reporting the following:  cancer, 
diabetes, high cholesterol, hypertension, heart disease, arthritis, asthma, depression or anxiety, 
and back problems.   
Table 3 provides variable definitions and summary statistics for the sample of 
households.  As can be seen, the underinsurance rate (based on the 10% threshold) is lower 
among small-firm households than among large-firm households (4.72% vs. 5.23%).  Similarly, 
there is only a small difference in the underinsurance rate between the two groups – 5.92% vs. 
6.01% -- when using a graduated threshold measure of underinsurance.  This latter measure 
classifies low-income households (< 200% FPL) as underinsured if they spend more than 5% of 
after-tax income on medical care and applies the 10% threshold to all other households.  These 
results are puzzling given the large differences in the characteristics of plans offered by small 
and large firms (described in Table 1), highlighting the potential importance of moral hazard.  
 
V.   Method of Adjusting the Underinsurance Measure to Account for Moral Hazard 
In this section, we present our method of adjusting for moral hazard when calculating the 
relative underinsurance rates between any two populations that differ in the average generosity 
of their health insurance.  Our method requires five steps, which are described below. 
First, we estimate the conditional distribution of total household medical care spending 
separately for the sample of large-firm households (that have, on average, more generous plans) 











9 We use quantile rather than mean regression because the relationship between 
household characteristics and spending varies at different points of the spending distribution. The 
variables we condition on include household demographics, human capital, income, medical 
conditions, and geographic region.   
Second, for each household type, we generate two predicted values of total spending.  
The first measure (“predicted”) is predicted total spending using each household’s demographic, 
income, medical, and geographic characteristics and the parameter estimates from the quantile 
regressions for their own household type (small-firm or large-firm household).  The second 
measure (“adjusted”) captures what total medical care spending of small-firm (large-firm) 
households would have been had they had the more (less) generous health plans.  That is, we 
predict total spending for each household based on each observation’s characteristics but using 
the estimated coefficients from the quantile regressions from the other household type.
10  We 
thus have four unique distributions of predicted spending: (i) predicted small-firm household 
spending based on small-firm household characteristics and coefficients from the small-firm 
household models, (ii) adjusted small-firm household spending based on small-firm household 
characteristics and coefficients from the large-firm household models, (iii) predicted large-firm 
household spending based on large-firm household characteristics and coefficients from the 
                                                            
9 All analyses are estimated using sampling weights. We have tested the sensitivity of our results to estimating these 
models at other quantiles and, in  our application, the results were robust. It is possible that in other applications the 
choice of the set of quantiles could matter.   
10 We generate predicted total spending values using each of the five quantile regression models, yielding five 
observations per household.  The predicted distribution of total spending thus depends on estimates from each of the 




large-firm household models, and (iv) adjusted large-firm household spending based on large-
firm household characteristics and coefficients from the small-firm household models.  
Since small-firm households tend to have less generous insurance and, as a result, likely 
cut back on their spending (due to “reverse” moral hazard), we would expect their adjusted 
spending distribution to be shifted to the right (i.e., to yield higher predicted spending levels) 
relative to their predicted actual spending.
11  Similarly, since large-firm households tend to have 
more generous insurance and likely increase their spending due to moral hazard, we would 
expect their adjusted spending distribution to be shifted to the left (i.e., to yield lower predicted 
spending levels) relative to their predicted actual spending.  
While the predicted spending measure does not, of course, capture unobservable 
differences between small- and large-firm households, given that we have a rich set of 
explanatory variables, including a large set of medical conditions, we believe we have captured 
most of the critical characteristics that determine health care spending and which might differ by 
firm size.  Our predicted spending measures also do not account for adverse selection in the 
choice of health plan.  Future applications of this method could yield improved estimates of 
predicted spending and of adjusted predicted spending with an even more complete set of 
controls. 
Our third step is to estimate cost-sharing parameters for the small-firm and large-firm 
households in our data. Cost sharing differs across the total spending distribution due to 
differences in benefit design features such as deductibles and out-of-pocket maximums.  To 
capture this variation, we calculate the average fraction of out-of-pocket spending to total 
spending by households’ reported total spending decile (separately for small-firm and large-firm 
                                                            




households).  Among small firm households, these cost-sharing parameters range from 0.533 
among households in the first decile of total spending to 0.166 among households in the tenth 
decile.  The range is somewhat narrower for large-firm households:  0.379 among households in 
the first decile to 0.141 among households in the tenth decile).  Each household is assigned the 
cost-sharing parameter that corresponds to its firm-size and its decile of predicted total spending.    
The fourth step is to compute the expected out-of-pocket medical spending for each 
household.  To do this, we multiply the value of the household’s predicted and adjusted total 
medical spending values by their cost-sharing parameter. 
Finally, we calculate the ratio of expected out-of-pocket spending to actual after-tax 
income.  This ratio is then compared to the threshold relevant to the particular measure of 
underinsurance being used. For example, under a 10% threshold measure, if this ratio exceeds 




  We calculate observed rates of underinsurance and, using the method described in the 
previous section, rates of underinsurance for small-firm and large-firm households that take into 
account the effects of moral hazard.   We present two sets of estimates: “predicted” and 
“adjusted.”
13  Predicted rates are based on households’ predicted out-of-pocket spending relative 
                                                            
12 The ratio corresponds to Column (H) of Table 3 and the underinsurance indicator corresponds to Column (I). 
13 Actual underinsurance rates are presented in Table 3.  We cannot compare actual underinsurance rates with 




to their own income; adjusted rates for small-firm (large-firm) households are based on 
households’ predicted out-of-pocket spending estimated using large-firm (small-firm) model 
parameters as the baseline. We calculate two measures of underinsurance: (1) a straight 10% 
threshold and (2) a graduated threshold based on FPL.  
Based on their predicted spending, only a slightly larger percentage of small-firm 
households are underinsured than are large-firm households, using either the 10% threshold 
measure (4.3% versus 3.9%) or the graduated threshold (5.9% versus 5.5%); see Table 4.
14 
However, because moral hazard leads households with less generous coverage to cut back on 
their spending relative to households with more generous coverage, the differences in predicted 
underinsurance are misleading.   
Adjusting for moral hazard leads to a 5.7% increase in predicted total spending for small-
firm households ($5,813 versus $5,499), consistent with our expectation that these households 
respond to their less generous coverage by cutting back on spending.
15 Moral hazard also has the 
effect of reducing out-of-pocket spending among small-firm households.  Adjusting for moral 
hazard leads to a 5.3% increase in predicted out-of-pocket spending among small-firm 
households.   
    We also present the effects of this adjustment on underinsurance rates in Table 4.  The 
result of these adjustments leads to a 21% increase in the underinsurance rate among small-firm 
households (using large-firm household spending as a baseline) using the 10% threshold 
                                                            
14 The results from the quantile regressions are presented in Appendix Tables A1-A2.   
15 Similarly, adjusting for moral hazard leads to a 5.6% decrease in predicted total spending for large-firm 
households ($5,629 versus $5,961), consistent with households’ spending more in response to generous coverage 




measure.  Adjusting for moral hazard also substantially affects the measure of underinsurance 
that uses the graduated threshold, increasing it by 15%.   
The effects of moral hazard lead to a highly misleading picture of the difference in 
underinsurance rates between small- and large-firm households.  The differences in predicted 
underinsurance rates between small-firm and large-firm households are very small -- 0.004 based 
on either threshold measure.  Adjusting for moral hazard, however, leads to a 225% increase in 
this difference (from 0.004 to 0.013) when using large-firm spending as the baseline.  
        Our adjustment methods illustrate that the puzzle of relatively greater underinsurance 
rates among large-firm households can be explained by small-firm households’ cutting back on 
care in response to their less generous coverage relative to what they would have spent if they 
had the more generous coverage enjoyed by large firm workers.  Not accounting for the reverse 
moral hazard associated with less generous coverage reduces the relative underinsurance rates 
among groups with less generous coverage.  We also find the corresponding but opposite effect 
when examining the issue from the large-firm household’s perspective.  That is, underinsurance 
rates of large-firm households fall when the effect of moral hazard is taken into account (see 
Table A3.)   
VII. Conclusions 
Underinsurance, the phenomenon of insured households’ being unable to afford the out-
of-pocket cost of their medical care, is a growing policy concern. In this paper, we show that 
moral hazard matters for measures of underinsurance. That is, the fact that people with more 




measures of underinsurance.  Adjusting for this moral hazard effect is necessary when estimating 
the relative rates of underinsurance across groups.  We show that in the absence of this 
adjustment, roughly the same percentage of households who obtain their insurance coverage 
from a large firm are underinsured as the percentage of households who obtain their insurance 
coverage from a small-firm.  This result would be puzzling because small firms typically offer 
less generous insurance in terms of deductibles, co-insurance rates, and annual out-of-pocket 
limits.  Adjusting for the effects of moral hazard, we find that our estimate of the percentage of 
small-firm households who are underinsured increases substantially — by roughly 20%.  
Moreover, the difference in underinsurance rates between small-firm and large-firm households 
under our corrected measure is 225% larger than the unadjusted difference.  
Our application addresses the measurement of disparities in coverage of small- versus 
large-firm workers but the problem, as well as our method to correct it, is more general. Moral 
hazard could affect comparisons between any groups with differing levels of coverage 
generosity.  Our application shows that adjusting for moral hazard can make a substantial 
difference in the number of households identified as underinsured and in the relative rates of 
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Table 1:  Summary Statistics on ESI Plan Characteristics, by Firm Size     
  
                
 Mean  25th  Percentile  75th  Percentile 95th  Percentile 
Firm Size (# of Employees) 
























Deductibles                 
Single Deductible ($)  $917  $543  $374  $500  $250  $250  $1,000  $500 $500 $2,500 $1,500  $1,000 
Family Deductible ($)  $1,875  $1,076  $799  $600  $500  $100  $2,500  $1,200  $1,300 $6,000 $3,000  $3,000 
Co-Payment and Co-Insurance              
% with Office Co-payment  79%  76%  3%  --  --  --  --  --  --  --  --  -- 
Office  Copay  ($)  $20 $18  $3 $15 $15  $0 $25  $20  $5  $35  $30  $5 
% with Office Co-insurance  16%  21%  -5%  -- -- -- -- -- --  --  --  -- 
Office  Coinsurance  (%)  20% 18%  2% 20% 10% 10% 20%  20%  0%  40%  30% 10% 
% with Hospital Co-payment  32%  30%  2%  --  --  --  --  --  --  --  --  -- 
Hospital  Copay  ($)  $584 $355 $229 $100 $100  $0 $500  $300 $200 $2,000 $1,250 $750 
% with Hospital Co-insurance  47%  54%  -7%  --  --  --  --  --  --  --  --  -- 
Hospital  Coinsurance  (%)  19% 17%  2% 20% 10% 10% 20%  20%  0%  30%  30%  0% 
% with Drug Co-payment  93%  89%  4%  --  --  --  --  --  --  --  --  -- 
Drug  Copay  ($)  $13  $10 $2  $10 $8 $2  $15  $10 $5 $25 $20 $5 
% with Drug Co-insurance  8%  13%  -5%  --  --  --  --  --  --  --  --  -- 
Drug  Coinsurance  40% 24% 17% 20% 20%  0% 50%  25% 25% 100%  50% 50% 
Annual Out-of-pocket Limits                
% with Single OOP Limit  68%  73%  -5%  --  --  --  --  --  --  --  --  -- 
Single Max OOP limit  $2,380  $2,102  $278  $1,250 $1,250  $0 $3,000  $2,500  $500  $5,000  5000  $0 
% with Family OOP Limit  60%  70%  -10%  --  --  --  --  --  --  --  --  -- 
Family Max OOP limit  $5,174  $4,667  $507  $2,600 $3,000  -$400 $6,000  $6,000  $0 $10,500 $10,000  $500 
Source: John Sommers, AHRQ based on the 2005 MEPS - Insurance Component             
 




Table 2:  How Moral Hazard Matters:  An Example 
 
Panel A:  How Moral Hazard Matters for Measuring Underinsurance: An Example




                                                                Income  Ratio of 
OOP to 
Income       




  (A)  (B)     (C)                                                            (G)  (H)  (I) 
Household 
X 
Generous 5000  1500 15000 0.10 Yes 
Household  
Y 
Stingy 3500  1400 15000 0.093 No 
Panel B:  Adjusting a Measure of Underinsurance to Account for Moral Hazard 






















Own Plan      
(D) * (E) 
Income Ratio  of 
Expected 
OOP to 
Income     










Generous 5000  1500 0.3 5000 1500 15000 0.100 Yes 
Household 
Y 
Stingy 3500  1400 0.4 5000 2000 15000 0.133 Yes 
Note: Household X and household Y are identical except for their plan type (generous; stingy).  Underinsurance is defined here as having out-of-




Table 3:  Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean  Standard 
deviation 
Underinsurance rate (%) (10% threshold) for small 
firm households 
4.72 21.2 
Underinsurance rate (%) (10% threshold) for large 
firm households 
5.23 22.3 
Underinsurance rate (5% threshold < 200% FPL, 
10% above 200% FPL) for small firm households 
5.92 23.6 
Underinsurance rate (5% threshold < 200% FPL, 
10% above 200% FPL) for large firm households 
6.01 2.38 
Household Total Medical Expenditures (1000s, 
$2007) for small firm households 
6.264 12.964 
Household Total Medical Expenditures (1000s, 
$2007) for large firm households 
7.212 15.450 
Household Out-of-Pocket Spending (1000s, $2007) 
for small firm households 
1.407 2.051 
Household Out-of-Pocket Spending (1000s, $2007) 
for large firm households 
1.330 2.209 
Small Establishment Household   0.366 0.482 
Age of policyholder  43.977 12.256 
Education of policyholder  14.038 2.413 
White   0.830 0.376 
Black 0.108 0.310 
Asian 0.043 0.204 
Hispanic 0.087 0.281 
Married 0.530 0.499 
Number of children < 18  0.560 0.946 




First income quartile (< $32.0)  .250 .433 
Second income quartile ($32.0, $48.89)  .250 .433 
Third income quartile ($48.90, $73.32)  .250 .433 
Fourth income quartile (> $73.32)  .250 .433 
MSA 0.859 0.348 
Northeast 0.207 0.405 
Midwest 0.240 0.427 
South 0.329 0.470 
Policyholder is a union member  0.212 0.409 
Number of household members with cancer  0.068 0.267 
Number of household members with diabetes  0.094 0.308 
Number of household members with high 
cholesterol 
0.212 0.474 
Number of household members with hypertension  0.296 0.535 
Number of household members with heart disease  0.088 0.292 
Number of household members with arthritis  0.025 0.165 
Number of household members with asthma  0.107 0.346 
Number of household members with mental health 
condition 
0.295 0.584 
Number of household members with back 
problems 
0.212 0.467  
Table 4: Predicted and Adjusted Medical Care Spending and Underinsurance, Small- Firm Households 
              




































for Moral Hazard 
Using Large-Firm 










e due to 
Adjustment for 
Moral Hazard 
Mean, Total medical care 
spending 
$5,499 $5,813  5.7%  $5,961       
Mean, Out-of-pocket medical 
care spending 
$1,371 $1,444  5.3%  $1,286       
Underinsurance rate  
(10% threshold) 
0.043 0.052  21%  0.039  0.004  0.013 225% 
Underinsurance rate  
(5% for < 200% FPL; 10% 
others) 
0.059 0.068  15%  0.055  0.004  0.013 225% 
1Predicted values of total medical care spending from the quantile regression model of total spending.  Predicted for small-firm households uses both small-firm characteristics and 
estimated coefficients from small-firm regressions.  Predicted for large-firm households uses both large-firm characteristics and estimated coefficients from large-firm regressions. 
Predicted out-of-pocket spending uses predicted total spending multiplied by estimated cost-sharing.  Estimated cost-sharing is the average fraction of out-of-pocket spending to 
total spending by households’ reported total spending decile (separately for small-firm and large-firm households).  Predicted underinsurance is based on the ratio of predicted out-
of-pocket spending to actual income. 
2 Adjusted values are predictions of total medical care spending using small-firm household characteristics and estimates from the large-firm quantile regression model.  
Table A1:   Quantile Regressions  of Total Medical Care Spending, Large Firm Households
  10th 30th 50th 70th  90th
Age of oldest policyholder in household  0.0035025 0.01 0.0190806 0.048351  0.103483
 ‐ 0.0020503 (0.0031649)** (0.0047365)** (0.0071216)**  (0.0223848)**
Highest education years of policyholders in 
household 
0.0309034 0.068055 0.0840637 0.1463639  0.1436388
  (0.0084950)** (0.0133228)** (0.0206183)** (0.0307850)** ‐ 0.0895383
White race/ethnicity ‐ 0.0066583 0.1327721 ‐0.1499751 ‐0.5335571  0.7820083
 ‐ 0.1166869 ‐0.1800579 ‐0.3139043 ‐0.4553603 ‐ 1.2489493
Black race/ethnicity ‐ 0.2112099 ‐0.2160321 ‐0.539119 ‐1.0190408 ‐ 0.442692
 ‐ 0.1263253 ‐0.1949371 ‐0.3314155 (0.4798441)* ‐ 1.3276333
Asian race/ethnicity ‐ 0.4136599 ‐0.294201 ‐0.7644882 ‐1.0520534  0.8715989
  (0.1395081)** ‐0.2181539 (0.3648671)* ‐0.540844 ‐ 1.5711847
Hispanic race/ethnicity ‐ 0.4849624 ‐0.2396492 ‐0.3233902 ‐0.5540547 ‐ 1.1115463
  (0.0646813)** (0.1056158)* (0.1593825)* (0.2463230)* ‐ 0.6869551
Policyholder is married  0.4318964 0.8174658 1.248957 2.2839752  3.4199297
  (0.0555744)** (0.0829693)** (0.1269008)** (0.1908073)**  (0.5847211)**
Number of children younger than 18  0.2385319 0.2441289 0.4723554 0.6861885  1.6479616
  (0.0232931)** (0.0362571)** (0.0557259)** (0.0823575)**  (0.2595329)**
First income quartile ‐ 0.0211624 ‐0.1769761 ‐0.2312394 0.2509493  1.7059176
 ‐ 0.0719181 ‐0.1094789 ‐0.1678553 ‐0.2528206  (0.7665998)*
Second income quartile ‐ 0.0372836 ‐0.2592783 ‐0.378163 0.0065724  1.1506693
 ‐ 0.0628531 (0.0953270)** (0.1473235)* ‐0.2254993 ‐ 0.652841
Third income quartile ‐ 0.0608837 ‐0.2554456 ‐0.2336489 0.1781744  1.0088286
 ‐ 0.0600508 (0.0890578)** ‐0.1355108 ‐0.2022955 ‐ 0.59992
=1 if lives in MSA, 0 if non MSA  0.1511822 0.0015933 ‐0.0442073 ‐0.3215069  0.5811325
  (0.0618251)* ‐0.0906806 ‐0.1359927 ‐0.2070243 ‐ 0.5843475
=1 if lives in Northeast census region ‐ 0.0133726 ‐0.0112326 ‐0.01831 ‐0.5783121 ‐ 2.1994606
 ‐ 0.0639993 ‐0.0992286 ‐0.1484734 (0.2242259)**  (0.6686817)**
=1 if lives in Midwest census region ‐ 0.0165174 0.1785517 0.3248609 0.1860745  1.2004322
 ‐ 0.0565773 ‐0.09235 (0.1409432)* ‐0.2132143 ‐ 0.6432694
=1 if lives in South census region ‐ 0.0395981 0.0445862 ‐0.1163862 ‐0.5617678 ‐ 1.6912973
 ‐ 0.053836 ‐0.0899191 ‐0.1365844 (0.2057697)**  (0.6134180)**
=1 if union household, 0 ow  0.0133726 0.2438073 0.28592 0.4572171  1.2455997
 ‐ 0.0487863 (0.0743637)** (0.1120412)* (0.1709162)**  (0.5121359)*
Number in household with cancer diagnosis  0.992983 2.4655846 3.3541369 4.6039117  18.3728581
  (0.0781165)** (0.1148307)** (0.1776600)** (0.2641845)**  (0.8458655)**
Number in household with diabetes diagnosis  1.1060872 1.3455187 2.176344 3.1053304  4.3627576
  (0.0689055)** (0.1030258)** (0.1546945)** (0.2249842)**  (0.6759991)**
Number in household with high cholesterol 
diagnosis 




  (0.0514618)** (0.0749349)** (0.1096763)** (0.1617087)**  (0.4893018)**
Number in household with hypertension 
diagnosis 
0.4763056 0.91114 1.2887162 1.7891107  2.7715712
  (0.0416718)** (0.0640599)** (0.0969952)** (0.1441591)**  (0.4498661)**
Number in household with heart disease 
diagnosis 
0.9957451 1.6007056 2.1337608 5.3272863  13.287302
  (0.0722688)** (0.1071257)** (0.1565000)** (0.2329596)**  (0.7223229)**
Number in household with arthritis diagnosis  1.690255 2.1737852 4.6871519 7.4643835  11.5214327
  (0.0969726)** (0.1740456)** (0.2589924)** (0.3805768)**  (1.3007496)**
Number in household with asthma diagnosis  0.8038603 0.9982606 1.058909 1.0995602  0.8427959
  (0.0562632)** (0.0924689)** (0.1336248)** (0.1925751)** ‐ 0.5972283
Number in household with depression or 
anxiety diagnosis 
0.6402517 1.3713798 2.1407505 2.8687967  6.0591686
  (0.0331231)** (0.0531865)** (0.0815719)** (0.1202964)**  (0.3571227)**
Number in household with back pain 
diagnosis 
0.3455024 1.0416031 1.6496641 2.9150632  5.1373314
  (0.0501850)** (0.0687861)** (0.1008201)** (0.1480319)**  (0.4282482)**
Constant ‐ 0.6400697 ‐1.0876031 ‐0.866934 ‐1.5862833 ‐ 3.7321068
  (0.2079340)** (0.3290063)** ‐0.5290207 (0.7806541)* ‐ 2.3771067
Observations  2957 2957 2957 2957  2957
Pseudo‐R










  10th 30th 50th 70th  90th
Age of oldest policyholder in household  0.0003929 0.0068506 0.0130341 0.0313286  0.0730499
 ‐ 0.0037484 (0.0027341)* (0.0059810)* (0.0100390)**  (0.0359718)*
Highest education years of policyholders in 
household 
0.0243422 0.0402951 0.0848184 0.0937261 ‐ 0.0971992
 ‐ 0.0170142 (0.0132246)** (0.0280666)** ‐0.0483748 ‐ 0.1703214
White race/ethnicity ‐ 0.1196953 0.0627295 ‐0.303349 0.4587277 ‐ 1.9541189
 ‐ 0.2243969 ‐0.1853988 ‐0.4193419 ‐0.6760834 ‐ 1.9233453
Black race/ethnicity ‐ 0.2363149 ‐0.0400344 ‐0.2697548 0.3849686 ‐ 0.4209563
 ‐ 0.2477609 ‐0.2029221 ‐0.4546334 ‐0.7324802 ‐ 2.218516
Asian race/ethnicity ‐ 0.6643337 ‐0.7813309 ‐0.6522051 0.1063159 ‐ 3.6425418
  (0.2639447)* (0.2319698)** ‐0.5207092 ‐0.8308526 ‐ 2.5406553
Hispanic race/ethnicity ‐ 0.0343341 ‐0.1464253 ‐0.0651707 ‐0.1412499  2.0369842
 ‐ 0.1352285 ‐0.0977347 ‐0.2199975 ‐0.3775533 ‐ 1.2693071
Policyholder in household is married  0.5521387 0.8911352 1.7423961 2.4056005  3.3443905
  (0.1203041)** (0.0793651)** (0.1691156)** (0.2793685)**  (0.9642480)**
Number of children younger than 18  0.1447115 0.2821033 0.2620185 0.6394138  1.3244871
  (0.0506228)** (0.0339186)** (0.0751674)** (0.1301343)**  (0.4543822)**
First income quartile ‐ 0.3883334 ‐0.5341883 ‐0.7427138 ‐0.5412879 ‐ 0.6767219
  (0.1704270)* (0.1075034)** (0.2252552)** ‐0.364697 ‐ 1.1788965
Second income quartile ‐ 0.445438 ‐0.5766784 ‐0.8600211 ‐0.7596623 ‐ 1.2886873
  (0.1449141)** (0.0938096)** (0.1974593)** (0.3264855)* ‐ 1.1000392
Third income quartile ‐ 0.4340627 ‐0.472561 ‐0.7866756 ‐0.9276264 ‐ 0.540482
  (0.1248752)** (0.0835875)** (0.1826380)** (0.3023582)** ‐ 1.0453626
=1 if lives in MSA, 0 if non MSA  0.0718479 0.1410626 ‐0.1883463 ‐0.0629301 ‐ 0.9485389
 ‐ 0.1130951 ‐0.0765491 ‐0.1685573 ‐0.2815753 ‐ 1.0773282
=1 if lives in Northeast census region  0.2878949 ‐0.0579699 ‐0.1337929 ‐0.5432242 ‐ 1.1946479
  (0.1322695)* ‐0.089602 ‐0.1904487 ‐0.3156439 ‐ 1.0940222
=1 if lives in Midwest census region  0.3728687 0.1182144 0.1821198 0.3167646  3.8177311
  (0.1238143)** ‐0.0857414 ‐0.1866467 ‐0.3037118  (1.0675526)**
=1 if lives in South census region  0.3468536 0.036448 ‐0.0912132 ‐0.2161575 ‐ 0.9889983
  (0.1144042)** ‐0.078633 ‐0.1706544 ‐0.2818369 ‐ 0.9680906
=1 if union household, 0 ow  0.096089 0.1658009 0.1851084 0.1767706  0.8598079
 ‐ 0.1209194 (0.0785514)* ‐0.1720053 ‐0.2789449 ‐ 0.9665964
Number in household with cancer diagnosis  1.0639222 2.2132064 3.1814325 6.5099136  19.2210774
  (0.1617812)** (0.1056527)** (0.2317751)** (0.3834357)**  (1.2630135)**




  (0.1178430)** (0.0919558)** (0.2037296)** (0.3104451)**  (1.2039943)**
Number in household with high cholesterol 
diagnosis 
0.8433641 1.012128 1.15881 1.1976621  2.5394451
  (0.0889495)** (0.0672350)** (0.1459794)** (0.2382858)**  (0.8198816)**
Number in household with hypertension 
diagnosis 
0.4447175 0.6757838 0.755925 1.0721023  3.1009246
  (0.0899100)** (0.0590513)** (0.1304222)** (0.2203847)**  (0.8355261)**
Number in household with heart disease 
diagnosis 
1.0319847 1.2720755 1.510054 5.8764238  8.8478838
  (0.1243148)** (0.1039900)** (0.2211381)** (0.3551167)**  (1.1979462)**
Number in household with arthritis diagnosis  0.5365644 0.8081419 2.6165649 1.7285411 ‐ 0.9854191
  (0.2116967)* (0.1808293)** (0.3900993)** (0.5963089)** ‐ 2.2314471
Number in household with asthma diagnosis  0.6726139 0.8694534 1.2458381 1.4936613  1.9842026
  (0.1233384)** (0.0834651)** (0.1859437)** (0.3094979)** ‐ 1.0952183
Number in household with diagnosis of 
depression or anxiety 
0.7007196 1.6708697 2.1424059 2.5193984  5.291325
  (0.0699122)** (0.0490458)** (0.1083030)** (0.1831422)**  (0.6549096)**
Number in household with back pain  0.3533694 0.7740665 1.7510722 2.1159615  4.2137322
  (0.0875931)** (0.0676735)** (0.1404808)** (0.2233888)**  (0.7341923)**
Constant ‐ 0.2779957 ‐0.4126587 ‐0.0440942 ‐1.0938986  5.5160919
 ‐ 0.4439392 ‐0.3290469 ‐0.7112031 ‐1.1650146 ‐ 3.9901765
Observations  1591 1591 1591 1591  1591
Pseudo‐R
2  0.12 0.18 0.21 0.22  0.24
Source:  Authors’ calculations based on data from 2005 MEPS‐HC.  
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses; 
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Mean, Total medical care spending  $5,961  $5,629  -5.6%  $5,499       
Mean, Out-of-pocket medical care 
spending 
$1,286 $1,214  -5.6%  $1,371       
Underinsurance rate  
(10% threshold) 
0.039 0.032 -18%  0.043  0.004  0.011  175% 
Underinsurance rate  
(5% for < 200% FPL; 10% others) 
0.048 0.03  -38%  0.059  0.011  0.029  164% 
1Predicted values of total medical care spending from the quantile regression model of total spending.  Predicted for large-firm households uses both large-firm 
characteristics and estimated coefficients from large-firm regressions. Predicted for small-firm households uses both small-firm characteristics and estimated 
coefficients from small-firm regressions.  Predicted out-of-pocket spending uses predicted total spending multiplied by estimated cost-sharing.  Estimated cost-
sharing is the average fraction of out-of-pocket spending to total spending by households’ reported total spending decile (separately for small-firm and large-firm 
households).  Predicted underinsurance is based on the ratio of predicted out-of-pocket spending to actual income. 
2 Adjusted values are predictions of total medical care spending using large-firm household characteristics and estimates from the small-firm quantile regression 
model. 